

Arhe XIII, 25/2016  
UDK 1 : 111.62  
1 : 316.485.6  
Originalni naučni rad  
Original Scientific Article

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## CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

**Abstract:** The eastern and western philosophies have elaborated greatly on the issue of conflict, conflict resolution, development, war, peace, etc. The common axis in many of the theories is the human factor, the way the individual perceives and is affected by these phenomena. In these theories there is an attempt to establish a working connection between the practical and the ideal. While conflict can be either a basis for societal development or non development, it also substantiates a perspective for the existence of values which are eventually intrinsic to political and moral improvements. Such values aim at the direction of prosperity and well-being, which remains an ecumenical and diachronic problem, not only under economic terms. Human societies are still faced with the dilemma, whether material progress is the fast track to the resolution on conflict. However, what is still disregarded, as shown in comparative philosophical literature, is that development has to take into consideration a richer notion of the human being; one concerned with elements of his inner reality. In that sense, development is the aftermath not only of the avoidance of war or conflict but of the enrichment of human life and action with certain advancements in individual and collective virtues, advancements that offer macroscopically benefit to the political.

**Keywords:** Comparative philosophy, conflict, development, eudaimonia, prosperity, war, liberation, politics, homo economicus

The eastern and western philosophies have elaborated greatly on the issue of conflict, conflict resolution, development, war, peace, etc. The common axis in many of the theories is the human factor, the way the individual perceives and is affected by these phenomena. Despite the collective character of the analyses often made by the social sciences, in philosophy there is an opportunity to face these matters holistically without disregarding the personal and individual element. While conflict can be either a basis for

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societal development or non development, it also substantiates a perspective for the existence of values which are eventually intrinsic to political and moral improvements. Such values aim at the direction of prosperity and well-being, which remains an ecumenical and diachronic problem, not only under economic terms. In this paper conflict will be considered as a general term, often related with the concept of war but not exclusively.

To begin with the latter, in the eastern tradition, Sun Tzu's book, the *Art of War*, sets the prerequisites for a successful outcome in armed combat. For the Chinese thinker, the important thing in a military operation is victory, not persistence<sup>2</sup>. For him conflict can have unpleasant results so it has to be well thought of whether opposing parties will attempt to resolve their differences by means of the expansion and culmination of their conflict. In Sun Tzu's words, "those who are ready to die can be killed; those who are intent on living can be captured; those who are quick to anger can be shamed; those who are puritanical can be disgraced; those who love people can be troubled"<sup>3</sup>. Confucius also realizes how sending innocent and untrained people to war equals with sending them to their loss<sup>4</sup>. The Chinese teacher considers certain values as central in the conceptualization of self development and self completion, as opposed to a life of conflict and subjection to calamity. These values are to be able to think of what is just instead of what is profitable, to be ready to defy one's own life in front of imminent danger and to abide by one's vows and promises no matter how long after. This enhancement of the element of personal attitude to strife and calamity, to the actual problems in life, in this context of loyalty, is considered even more valuable because it ends at a contemplative point where there is no distinction<sup>5</sup>. For the Chinese master, loyalty (zhong) denotes not only loyalty to one's superiors or peers but also to office; an alignment of self with the interests of others, or of the social group as a whole. Confucius constantly recognizes the ontological connection between all men as the basis for the cessation of all conflict: "in their human nature men are close to each other; through practice they are far distant"<sup>6</sup>. In the condition of virtue and through right practice, conflict does not exist since there is no distinction; man finds self-possession and is orientated to moral action.

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2 Tzu, S., *The Art of War*, translated by T. Cleary, Shambhala, Boston & London 1991, p. 16.

3 Tzu, S., *The Art of War*, p. 65.

4 Confucius, *Analects*, translated by E. Slingerland, Hackett, Indianapolis 2003, 13.29-13.30.

5 Confucius, *Analects*, 15.39- 15.41.

6 Confucius, *Analects*, 17. 2.

This idea finds full expression in Chinese Taoist philosophy, along with the idea that personal development should not be deterred by any other focus than the self. Zhuangzi's primary message reflects the need for a constant preoccupation with the way to attain spirited emancipation and an independent personality. For the Taoist philosopher<sup>7</sup> and his polysemous philosophical notions, beings are different in their nature, as in the story of *Xiao Yao You*. Moreover, they move, live and develop in different ways because they simply follow their nature, and live according to their inner abilities and functions. Both creatures of this fable, the big and the small, receive the same satisfaction, unless there is a distinction between them as the superior and the inferior. Zhuangzi emphasizes the principle of *Qui Wu*, the equalization of all things, as a fundamental principle of his philosophical theory on individual development. In the same context of the experience of knowledge, he examines the feasibility of development into perfect happiness. For Zhuangzi, there is a seeming paradox: This paradox is based on Zhuangzi's distinction between the absolute state of happiness (*zhile*) and mere happiness (*le*). "Le", this form of simpler happiness springs from things such as wealth, honor, a long life, kindness, good food, etc. The Chinese philosopher realises that the things which comprise the basis for this form of "everyday" happiness, as we could call it, are actually no more than a weight, a burden for the man who seeks fulfilment and true development into perfection. His sceptical stance<sup>8</sup> towards these material goods, or rather emotional products of a material happiness, extends to the degree where all these are seen as pure vanity, empty possessions, due to the fact that they exceed the actual needs that are derived from our presence in life. Becoming a possession of these possessions, that is to say, a slave to objects, signifies an elusive form of happiness, one that cannot endure. Thus, development towards the perfect happiness of "zhile" prevails as the one which does not allow man to surrender to the tempting idolatry of material things and treasures. The common values of the unwise, of the everyday people, are no fitting values in the condition of "zhile". Absolute happiness is a state of mind, purified from all desire, free from every restriction, conflict or distinction. The way of the Dao, of making no distinction, thus succumbing to no notional conflict or conflict of any other type, is a synonym for the Supreme One (*tai yi*)<sup>9</sup>.

7 Wang, K., *Eisagogi stin Kineziki Dianoisi [Introduction to Chinese Thought]*, translated (in Greek) by Kalliopi Tarasi, OCPC, Athens 2009, p. 45.

8 Cf. Coutinho, S., *Zhuangzi and Early Chinese Philosophy: Vagueness, Transformation and Paradox*, Ashgate, Burlington VT 2004, chapter 4.

9 Wang, K., *Eisagogi stin Kineziki Dianoisi [Introduction to Chinese Thought]*, p. 46.

To turn briefly to one of the major eastern terms that are concerned with conflict and development, in its origins, the term of “ahimsa”, a term employed so much by the Buddhist theory but also by Ghandi, primarily meant non-harm, non-injury, and not to hurt, however, it also had the sense of concern or caring for others. In some expressions, it even had a sense of compassion. The Buddhist thinkers regarding “ahimsa” note that human passion belongs to the category of violent deeds. This is the case because when one is passionate, he or she is self-engrossed, and loses the concern for the welfare of all. To back up this claim, let us quote Buddha saying, “that person is a *Muni* who is well composed in speech, thought, and bodily action, who has got rid of all the worldly passion”<sup>10</sup>. A *Muni* is a monk, and monks need to overcome passion, which is a form of craving, as they have renounced the material and sensible desires of the world. For his disciples, the Buddha has made these so important and salvific renunciations, and he has the wisdom of direct insight into the way things are but also complete compassion (*karuna*) for others, without distinction, who are suffering as he once was. True liberation begins when nothing is craved for nor is there any attachment to particular verbal formulations of the truth. In Buddhism liberation from ignorance is the only feasible development and the only secure path to the avoidance of any type of conflict, whether this is an inner conflict, of a psychological substratum, or an exterior conflict, a conflict connected with others.

Another perspective regarding conflict and development is elaborated in the scripture of the *Baghavad Gita*. Krishna, in this narration, encourages the warrior Arjuna to follow his destiny, his Dharma, which for him is to be engaged into the battle against his enemies. The Dharma is the duty that is dictated on each human being by its own nature, and stopping the Dharma or substituting it with another person’s Dharma only prevents the individual evolution of the human being. Krishna mentions clearly that each person’s own Dharma, even if without value, is preferable to another’s.<sup>11</sup> For Arjuna not to sin, he must follow his Dharma, but he must not do so in recognition of what is pleasant or unpleasant, profit or loss, victory or defeat, because the dualistic recognition of the phenomenal character of the human reality only obscures the true nature of the human being. Equally those who are absorbed by desire, pleasures and ambitions, will not be able to concentrate on “Samadhi” (enlightenment) and achieve “Yoga”<sup>12</sup>. Krishna further suggests

10 Ghosh, I. M., *Ahimsa: Buddhist and Gandhian*, Indian Bibliographies Bureau, Co-Publisher Balaji Enterprises, Delhi 1989, p. 72.

11 Miller, B., *The Bhagavad-Gita*, Random House, New York 2004, III. 35.

12 Miller, B., *The Bhagavad-Gita*, II. 43.

that to be able to liberate oneself from these passions and from the “Gunas”, qualities which constitute the “Prakriti” (primal matter), one should remain in “Sattva”, in the tranquil and self-mastering state, dealing with life events with self-mastery and without mental or emotional transitions<sup>13</sup>. The gist of Krishna’s advice is that Arjuna, and along with him every human being, should remain in “Sattva” (balance, order, purity), which is here understood as an equilibrium between “Rajas” (action, movement, dynamism) and “Tamas” (inaction, obscurity, passivity), in the sense that the human being ought to act and fulfill his Dharma, but without any attachment to the fruit of his work or deed. The Gita points to the direction of action, not passivity, as passivity would be “Tamas”, in an effort to make one realize that even though he may be living in a sphere of relativity, experiences of all kinds cannot have any influence on him. This is not an intellectual achievement primarily but a psychological one. While man does not become egoistically isolated into his inner realm, he does not allow himself to experience life events in a manner that would jeopardize his inner achievements. This brings two positive results: a) the mind is relieved of any stress regarding the results of the work, thus becoming able to concentrate in the practice of Yoga, b) His Karma is not burdened with the morally tainted outcome of his works, as there is no desire from his part. This entails that the person who acts thus, does so in accordance with his Dharma, not with the intention of his own success or profit. But in this sense, there is a teleological suspension of the ethical element, as this human being will go beyond the current terms of good and evil, in a situation that exceeds and ignores them. This will be his route to development in the individual sphere, whose aftermath will be evident in the social sphere as well. Conflict cannot be avoided but conflict takes place in a state of disinterestedness, banning out any personal benefit.

Despite the fact that it is believed by many that non-violence in conflict as a prerequisite for personal development is exclusively an eastern invention, during the Roman times, Cicero in *De Re Publica* takes a position against conflict and in favor of non-violence by commending Romulus for inculcating in Romans “a love for peace and tranquility which enable justice and good faith to flourish”<sup>14</sup>. The Roman orator also commends Romulus for “turn(ing) toward benevolence and kindness the thoughts of men who had become savage and brutish through their passion for war”<sup>15</sup>. Believing that justice prevails over wisdom, Philus, in the third book of *De Re Publica*,

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13 Miller, B., *The Bhagavad-Gita*, II. 45.

14 Cicero, *De Re Publica*, II. xiv. 26.

15 Cicero, *ibid*, II. xiv. 27.

instructs people to be merciful, to give everyone his due, respect property rights<sup>16</sup>, and in general to consider the interests of the whole human race.

Marcus Aurelius reflects this perspective by holding that it is against nature (*παρά φύσιν*) to act against another human being<sup>17</sup>. Abstinence from aggression against others does not begin from a social sensitivity but counter intuitively from individuality that bridges the gap towards the rest of the people with the aid of *logos*. Good has its locus in the individual; it is devoid of connotations of personal calculation which prevail when self-interest narrowly and subjectively conceived is pursued. Marcus Aurelius does not accept the modern idea of the inevitable and intrinsic conflict of interests between individuals and society. Enlightened self-interest becomes via *logos* the collective good. This process must not be conceived as an overlapping of interests, nor should it be seen as a calculation that what is good for the community will in the long run be good for me. The perfected individual or sage armored against the vicissitudes of life, approaches others as fellows, not as adversaries or potential victims. The only ‘other’ the sage fears is his unperfected self, his undeveloped own being. In the eleventh book of the *Meditations*, the Roman emperor points at the direction of a deeper understanding of the motives and qualities of people, one that leads to complete empathy<sup>18</sup>. One of his major points is that there should be no displeasure when others do rightly what they do; but even if they do not it must be remembered that they do so involuntarily and in ignorance. Marcus puts special emphasis on the fact that man should abstain from any negative attitude to other men since: (a) it is also in his own disposition to commit certain faults like they do, (b) he may not even understand whether men are doing wrong or not, due to the fact that many things are done with a certain reference to circumstances, (c) man’s life is brief, hence any disturbance related with exterior things, such as the behavior of others to us, is a waste of time. Marcus’s conclusion is that it is our own opinions which disturb us<sup>19</sup>.

In the *Eclogae*, Stobaeus stresses another important fact, which does not excuse other men but signifies the connection and mutual development between the virtuous: «Τά τε ἀγαθὰ πάντα τῶν σπουδαίων εἶναι [κοινά] λέγουσι, καὶ ὁ καὶ τὸν ὠφελοῦντά τινα τῶν πλησίων καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὠφελεῖν. Τήν τε ὁμόνοιαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν, δι’ ὃ καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους πάντας ὁμονοεῖν

16 Cicero, *ibid*, III. xv. 24.

17 Aurelius, M., *Meditations*, II. 1.

18 Cf. Epictetus, *Enchiridion*, XVI; Seneca, *De Clementia*, II. vi. 2; Seneca, *De Tranquillitate Animi*, XV. 5-6, etc.

19 Aurelius, M., *Meditations*, XI. 18.

ἀλλήλοις διά τό συμφωνεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατά τόν βίον. Τοῦς δέ φαύλους διαφωνοῦντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐχθρούς εἶναι καί κακοποιητικούς ἀλλήλων καί πολεμίους»<sup>20</sup>. According to the philosopher all goods are common to the virtuous and the person who offers benefit to others also benefits himself. Concord is the science of the common goods, and for that reason the virtuous are those who are in concord regarding the things that are related to living. On the contrary those who are full of vices are in discord and by that they become enemies and cause harm to each other, thus becoming opponents. In this context, conflict can be prevented only as the aftermath of action dependent upon character features, hence orientating human action to a highly anthropocentric and development-orientated virtue ethics and to the conceptualization of values of non violence in the procedure of human-making according to certain ideals.

In later times in western philosophy, Justus Lipsius, the Flemish humanist, who is influenced by ancient Stoicism, adopts a stance that relates conflict with fear: “You fear the war. I know it. Why? Because war draws with it punishment and destruction. To whom? To others at this present, but it may be shortly to you”<sup>21</sup>. For Lipsius, war and conflict at the extreme is unnecessary, for the main reason that it is inhuman to rejoice at the harm of other people and it is a natural corruption of man to do so. More than that, the world is everybody’s country, thus no conflict of that type over anything can be morally justified since no claim can be made on any part of the world as one’s own property and moreover, patriotism has no ethical basis since there is only one race and that is the whole mankind<sup>22</sup>. Hence no personal or patriotic insult can be taken as everything is done so according to theodicy to the preservation of the whole in its best possible state, disregarding partial or atomic interests. On this basis, Lipsius, in his second book of *De Constantia* rejects any possibility that God may be responsible for the calamities sent to men through the medium of other men; thus, it is always the human being who is held responsible for any form of destruction and conflict, other than those proceeding from the natural phenomena<sup>23</sup>. For the Flemish philosopher, development in human societies begins at the point where human beings are strengthened through turmoil and adversity so that they acquire constancy, patience and virtue. Thus, adversity and conflict can be producers

20 Stobaeus, *Eclogae*, II 93, 19W.

21 Lipsius, J., *De Constantia [On Constancy]*, edited by John Sellars, translated by John Stradling, Bristol Phoenix, Exeter 2006, book I, chapter IX.

22 Lipsius, J., *De Constantia [On Constancy]*, chapter XI.

23 Lipsius, J., *De Constantia [On Constancy]*, chapter VII.

of good values, of continuous character growth and amelioration despite the cost of pain<sup>24</sup>.

In his treatise *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, Hugo Grotius upholds that war is undertaken for the sake of peace, and there is no dispute at all, which may not give rise to war. All conflict can rise and escalate to extreme actions of hostility<sup>25</sup>. Grotius gives another perspective to conflict, focused more on the political element. For him, conflict arises when a civil right, or a right more or less extensive than the civil right, is at stake. The civil right is that which is derived from the civil power. The law of nations is a more extensive right, deriving its authority from the consent of all, or at least of many nations, as in the case of the European Union today. Grotius observes that Cicero, when discussing the bounds of good and evil, has well noted that everyone must approve and commend a disposition to adhere faithfully to their engagements not only from disinterested motives, but in some cases even in opposition to their own interest. Grotius mentions how Augustine remarks that it is right to maintain the pledge of faith given to an enemy, for under the character of enemies men do not lose their right to the fulfilment of a promise, a right which every one possessed of reason is capable of. It is the power of reason and speech from which the obligation of promises springs. Nor is it to be supposed that, because it is lawful to deceive an enemy on some occasions, the same rule will authorise a violation of faith in engagements. The obligation to speak the truth arises from causes antecedent in their existence to any state of warfare, and they are causes which a state of warfare may render necessary to change or abridge<sup>26</sup>. A promise, however, confers a new right of itself. Grotius upholds further that to destroy the principle which holds governments together, i.e. good faith, is to destroy the larger society of united nations and to destroy eventually the whole intercourse of mankind. Even when conflict and war have arisen there must remain the unabated desire, and invariable prospect of peace, as the only end for which hostilities can be lawfully begun. So in the prosecution of any hostile conflict human beings “must never carry the rage of it so far, as to unlearn the nature and dispositions of men”<sup>27</sup>.

But let us now move to another dealing of this issue in order to further this discussion in the context of sociopolitical conflict and development. In

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24 Lipsius, J., *De Constantia [On Constancy]*, chapter VIII.

25 Grotius, H., *De Jure Belli ac Pacis [On the Law of War and Peace]*, translated by A. C. Campbell, Batoche Books, Kitchener Ontario 2001, chapter 1, I.

26 Grotius, H., *De Jure Belli ac Pacis [On the Law of War and Peace]*, chapter 19, 1.

27 Grotius, H., *De Jure Belli ac Pacis [On the Law of War and Peace]*, chapter 25, II.

contemporary sociopolitical analyses theories concerning numbers, statistics, production scales, marketing activities etc are expounded, in connection with values of development, where the individual is quite narrowly illustrated as *homo economicus*, thus leaving out other prevalent aspects. This denotative undervaluation from the *homo sapiens* to the *homo economicus*, practically a version and extenuation of the *homo faber*, is not the product of an advancement, an evolution to the better, while it affects -or rather stigmatizes- our societies, especially the western technocratic ones. The more the economy becomes interdependent on a global scale, leading to an unprecedented economic determinism<sup>28</sup>, the less can regional and local governments, as they exist today, act upon the basic mechanisms that condition the daily existence of their citizens<sup>29</sup>. The lack of autonomy drastically affects the practicability of pioneering political schemes and becomes literally prohibitive for social experimentation in development. Conflicts continue, development is meant only under economic terms. Accelerated globalization actually not only threatens to undermine the assumed integrity of the nation state as the central organizing unit of domestic and external affairs but also to reify the values of the communities and to weaken the individual's bond with his Polity<sup>30</sup>, so as not to acquire any organicity. What initially seemed to be a blessing, that is the flexibility, rapidity and fluidity of such influences, may turn out to be a curse for the reason that things seem to alter in an extremely unpredictable and unbalanced way. Conflict in a variety of forms often may offer development opportunities, whereas individuals or minor nation-states, who abstain from major and central strategies, do not feel ready or eager to be integrated in the global city of today while, at the same time, the global city culturally and financially invades their territories in the most relentless way. On the contrary, individual improvement, according to Aristotle, means collective development and leads to political friendship. Thus, what we shall seek is an ethically motivated encounter with others on the basis of practicability with a view to maximize the well being of citizens in an open society but not a soci-

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28 Cf. Brien, K., *Marx, Reason and the Art of Freedom*, 2nd edition, Humanity Books, New York 2006, p. 49: "this interpretation [economic determinism] distorts the relationship between the economic base and the social superstructure. It views the superstructure as a more or less mechanical reflex of the economic base to the extent that the economic base is alone regarded as the determining factor of social development, with everything else being completely determined thereby".

29 Rubenstein, K. & Adler, D., "International Citizenship: The Future of Nationality in a Globalised World" in *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 7, 2000, p. 526.

30 Kennedy, P., *Preparing for the twenty-first century*, First Vintage Books Edition, New York 1994, p. 114.

ety that confuses practicability with chronicity. That is to say, that a society, as well as an individual, cannot aim for development by referring only to a short term horizon; their decisions should be able to ignore micro-benefit in favour of macro-benefit, or in other words they should refer to outcomes that will foster development in a larger and longer temporal context. A good and pragmatic decision on development cannot be only a short term investment.

According to the Stoic thinkers and Aristotle, we need to consciously set the target to excellence in our political conduct, instead of agonizing over numbers regarding the production and consumption of goods in view of a life of leisure. The dynastic view of *homo economicus* prevents any thought of critical reexamination of the possibility of virtue ethics back in the polis. The marginalization of virtue-oriented political theories and the consequent primacy of economics, business and technocracy favor only those who profit at the exorbitant cost of the humanitarian principles. That, by no means, can be taken for development. If blind trust in monetary wealth is irresponsibly left to replace a critical and contemplative societal value system, then the dependence on technology in order to promote global unity will hardly suffice nor will the politics of economics bring about the desired results, if the desired results are in any way associated with the good and eudaimonistic life. But ethically-oriented societies, that hierarchize the good of virtue as the most important one, will not thoughtlessly resort to conflict or violence; they will not risk to traumatize peace. Aristotle will always remind us of that: "A state is not a community of living beings only, but a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible"<sup>31</sup>. If there is a judicious consensus between such communities that is safeguarded by well defined and fair international laws, then tolerance is feasible and co existence is feasible in a parallel and not obligatory order. But the basic factor, according to the Greek philosopher, is the need of new orientation in our societies that will substantiate the distinction between economic development and overall development<sup>32</sup>: instead of a society eager to produce and to consume in great quantities there shall be a turn to a qualitative lifestyle which will place its emphasis on the good life, on virtue as competence, not on technical superiority.

What Aristotle cares to assert is how to correct the anomaly that is frequently inflicted in societies: that one citizen is ethically alienated from the other, in a process of development which seems to be beneficial for an individual but is not eventually so for this reason that it ignores the most imperative anthropological admittances. The correction of this anomaly is grounded

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31 Aristotle, *Politics*, VII 1328a 36-37.

32 Aristotle, *Politics*, VII 1332a 8-9.

on the constant and conscious effort of the citizen to maintain his systemic interconnection with other citizens in full recognition of his political role inside the community and of his ontological identity as a rational being. In this way, individuals or whole populations are not homogenized as statistical figures or as quantities, their reality is not deduced to be exclusively fiscal, while the notion of «κοινωνία» encourages the awareness that human beings consist valuable units, able for friendship to others as equals, adhering to the common human pursuit which is no other than individual, social and political eudaimonia; that is the Aristotelian ideal. William James, the American pragmatist, maintains that the world is made on a specific pattern, “tragically practical”. The actually possible in this world is vastly narrower than all that is demanded; that is how there is always a gap between the actual and the ideal which can be got through only by leaving part of the ideal behind. However, since some part of the ideal must be left behind, we need to know precisely which part that will be<sup>33</sup>. Development means that this cognitive and ethical conflict will have to cease, as the practical will have to become able to connect with the ideal to a definitive extent but not restrictively, not against human action and social well-being. This signifies not only the necessity for the prevention of conflict but greater awareness regarding the nature of development. As Herbert Marcuse believes, the reckless production comprises a vicious circle, a conflict within our societies, and the rational knowledge which favors (as a background) this production, is nothing but ignorance or Heideggerian care (Sorge). Marcuse understands that there is a conflict between production and profit on the one hand and self-determination on the other. Through technology, education, politics, economy are mixed together in a system that repels any counter-trend and subdues any development<sup>34</sup>. Human development, in a conclusive and overall estimation of the comparative philosophical literature on the issue, would mean our capacity to overcome any conceptual tension, as well as any pragmatic conflict, between prosperity in its material sense and well-being in the sense of eudaimonia; it would also denote our capacity to incorporate our value system in the practical world.

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33 James, W., *Pragmatism and other writings*, Penguin, New York 2000, p. 255.

34 Marcuse, H., *O monodiastatos antropos [One – Dimensional Man]*, transl. M. Lukoudi, Papazisi, Athens 1971, p. 29.

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## SUKOB I RAZVOJ IZ PERSPEKTIVE KOMPARATIVNE FILOZOFIJE

**Sažetak:** U istočnoj i zapadnoj filozofiji uveliko su razmatrana pitanja sukoba, rešavanja sukoba, razvoja, rata, mira itd. Uobičajena osa mnogih teorija jeste ljudski faktor, način na koji individua sagledava te fenomene i način na koji oni utiču na nju. U tim teorijama postoji pokušaj uspostavljanja radne veze između onoga praktičkog i onoga idealnog. Dok sukob može biti osnov ili za društveni razvoj ili za nerazvijanje, on takođe potvrđuje perspektivu o postojanju vrednosti koje su na koncu intrinzične moralnim i političkim poboljšanjima. Takve vrednosti za cilj imaju usmerenje prosperiteta i blagostanja, koje ostaje ekumenski i dijahronijski problem, i to ne samo u ekonomskom smislu. Ljudska društva su još uvek suočena s dilemom da li je materijalni napredak prečica za razrešenje sukoba. Ono što je, međutim, još uvek zanemareno, kao što je pokazano u komparativno-filozofskoj literaturi, jeste to što razvoj u obzir mora uzeti bogatiji pojam ljudskog bića; onaj koji brine o elementima njegove unutrašnje stvarnosti. U tom smislu, razvoj nije samo posledica izbegavanja rata ili sukoba, nego bogaćenja ljudskog života i čina praćenog izvesnim unapređenjima u individualnoj i kolektivnoj vrlini, unapređenjima koja nude makroskopsku dobit onome političkom.

**Ključne reči:** Komparativna filozofija, sukob, razvoj, *eudaimonia*, prosperitet, rat, oslobođenje, politika, *homo economicus*

*Primljeno: 15.02.2016.*

*Prihvaćeno: 08.05.2016.*

