DERRIDA’S ‘PHENOMENOLOGY OF VALUE’ AND THE THING IN THE EPOCH OF GLOBALIZATION

Abstract: In this paper I argue that Jacques Derrida’s writings on Marx draw out a “double frame” that constitutes the phenomenology of value. Whereas the interior part of the frame is composed of use-value (understood as a “working thing” or “thinking work”) the exterior corresponds to exchange-value, and it is from the uneven overlapping of the two that the economic reductions, subtractions, and additions begin. I, then, consider the fate of the inner frame in the epoch of globalization, in which the becoming-thing of the thing as such coincides with the projection of the inner frame of value onto the world.

Keywords: thinghood; commodity fetishism; world; work; frame

Right on the edge, very close to the outer frame of the phenomenology of value, I would like to situate a particular use-value: the unlaced, abandoned, useless shoes that Derrida borrows from Heidegger who, in turn, borrows them from Van Gogh. These coveted shoes are the main subject of The Truth in Painting, which erects the overarching, albeit porous, frame of the frame enclosing the realms of the aesthetic and the economic, the biological as well as the philosophical. The Truth in Painting elaborates on the thickness, the non-transparency, the non-coincidence of the inner and outer limits of the frame, implicating all of the blocked passages and impossible traversals between and beyond them. In this regard, the commodity-economic framework of value is not an exception. Whereas its interior part is composed of use-value, the exterior corresponds to exchange-value, and it is from the uneven overlapping of the two that the economic reductions, subtractions, and additions begin.

In the first subtraction, what interests Heidegger is “not the denuding of the foot, for example, but the denuding of the shoes that have become naked things again, without

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1 Žižek calls this unevenness “the parallax of the two frames [that] is not symmetrical”. He writes: “…all that has to intervene into the Real is an empty frame so that the same things we saw “directly” before are now seen through the frame. A certain surplus-effect is thus generated, which cannot simply be cancelled through demystification” (Slavoj Žižek, “A Plea for a Return to Differance (with a Minor Pro Domo Sua)”, Critical Inquiry 32, Winter 2006, pp. 234-5).
usefulness, stripped of their use-value” (TP 300). (I must mention, parenthetically, that despite his undeniable tendency to confine use-value to usefulness, in *Specters of Marx*, Derrida repeatedly and insistently points out the complexity and “under-determination” of this taken-for-granted term.) On one hand, the elimination of the inner frame denudes the things themselves in their truth as useless by removing the structure of being-intended-for superimposed on them. The shoes exit, walk out as though of their own accord, from the total context of signification and, in becoming unworkable, no longer ready to hand, come into their own. Their almost theatrical exit implies, for Heidegger, the ultimate truth of the thing devoid of signification and freed from use.

On the other hand—Derrida’s hand raised in protest to Heidegger—the deframing of the inner frame merely *displaces* this superimposed structure of intentionality to the outer limits of exchange-value that institutes a different regime of usefulness, of immaterial intentionality, exploited throughout the pulsion of capital. The specter of Marx’s inverted walking table reappears in the image of the auto-propelled shoes. Yet, even the Heideggerian displacement of utility loses its radical tinge because the shoes are paired (which means that they are prepared for the resumption of use) and because their pairing stays unquestioned: Heidegger “bound them [the shoes] together in order to bind them to the law of normal usage” (TP 333). Above all, it is impossible to abstract something like “truth” from signification. Even if it were arrived at, pure uselessness would merely resurrect another version of the transcendental signified predicated on absence and lack.

The act of stripping the thing itself is the hallmark of phenomenological reducti-

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2 Despite the undeniable Derridian tendency to confine use-value to usefulness, in *Specters of Marx*, Derrida points out the complexity and “under-determination” of this taken-for-granted term (cf. SM 150ff).

3 The institution of such a regime is the target of the complaint launched by Gayatri Spivak (“Limits and Openings of Marx in Derrida”, in *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (New York & London: Routledge, 1993): “There is no such thing as subtracting use-value from a thing in this sphere [Marx’s species-life], for the prior mark of the material transformation with Nature is mutely testified to even by the “thing in its nudity”. One can ‘subtract’ use-value (a methodological abbreviation) only in the other direction…to make quantitative exchange-value…” (p. 105).

4 This criticism mirrors the rebuke of Lacan in “Le Facteur de La Vérité” (PC 441ff).
terminate because it calls both for the overcoming of the use- and exchange-value in a recuperated, non-teleological view of Nature as much as for the intensification of the dynamics of surplus value—value above value. Derrida reads plus-value (that translates the German Mehrwert) on the model of the other expressions that include the un-translatable “plus de...” meaning, simultaneously, “more than” and “no more”. Surplus value aporetically conjoins the two meanings—more than value and no more value—and forms the remainder that “overflows (itself), into inadequation, excess, the supplement” (TP 298).

For Marx, the excess of the actual labor time over the labor time that “will keep the worker alive”5 is the indicator of the inadequation and injustice that, in not being restituted, drives the growth of capital. But how do the abandoned shoes enter the picture here? In their uselessness, the shoes have fallen; they neither support (by being-underneath, hypokeimenon), nor bear the working subject (TP 285)6. There are two possible explanations for this lack of support: 1) the worker has stopped working and is resting in a certain fullness of the accomplishment (déseoeuvrement), or 2) she is still working without being supported or restituted for the expenditure of labor power, above and beyond the minimum needed for subsistence. Although the two options grow from the same root, we most easily recognize the logic of surplus value in (2), where the fallen shoes are picked up, gathered together, and elevated into the prosthetic support for capital. The thing continues to work but not “for us”, or to quote TP, “surplus value is unleashed by the annulment of their [the shoes’] use-value” (TP 258).

Third, the subtraction of the outer frame (exchange-value) is far from unproblematic. At the extreme, it results in the fetishization of use-value, which is the concept Marx has vacated for interminable analysis. The denaturalization of the denaturalized fabricates an illusion of the unmediated presence for which Derrida chastises both Heidegger and his critic, Schapiro. The latter is chided for looking at the painting without a frame, for disregarding its materiality, and for the confusion of the painted shoes with the “real” shoes. The recession of the painting leaves behind the shoes—the things “present” in front of us—as well as their disputed possession (TP 272). Eliminating the actual frame of the painting and that which it enframes, Schapiro denies the shoes their represented and representative (exemplary) status, their capacity, time and again, to stand in for the thing in general, to relate to other things from the depth of their un-relatedness and abandon, to put themselves in the shoes of other things, in a word, to socialize.

Heidegger commits the same hermeneutical fallacy, but such that its sense is symmetrically inverted. He fetishizes the painting and situates the painted shoes in their self-generated discourse of truth: “Once they are painted, these shoes talk, this thing produced and detached from its subject begins to talk (about it)” (TP 323). The detachment of the thing from its use separates it from us, unseals the space from which discourse may arise and seals the unbound thinghood in its quasi-sacredness. But neither Schapi—

6 Another outcome of the fallen shoes is that they are “‘without’ use, and also, therefore, without truth”. Jay M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (Cambridge & Oxford, UK: Polity Press, 1992), p. 146. Derrida will complicate both uses of the “without”, but the same can be said about surplus value.
ro, nor Heidegger lives up to the task. Delivering a fetishized fetish, they usefully employ and profit from uselessness by proposing the existence of the originary truth of the thing, the truth it tells and the one told about it, be it the exact determination of its rightful proprietor or of its “thinghood”. And, conversely, Marx’s approach to use-value qua the supplement of the supplement, qua a derived term methodologically antecedent by exchange-value in Capital, clears the scene for a de-fetishized fetish.

The frame harbors yet another double potentiality, which, perhaps, comprises its thickness in the very moment when it turns inside out, interiorizes its outside, but also exteriorizes its inside. Derrida’s word for this reversal is “invagination”—not the total incorporation of the remainder inside something which is no longer a thing, but “the inward refolding of la gaine [the sheath, girdle], the inverted reapplication of the outer edge to the inside of a form where the outside then opens a pocket” (LO 97). While value is realized, fleetingly becomes res (a thing) in its “inward refolding” into use-value, its crises may be understood in terms of the inflexibility and the subsequent disjointure, the unhinging of the two parts of the frame, and, literally, the tearing apart of the sheath.

Still, the realization without realization of value is, to some extent, independent of use-value. Insofar as it is born of the comparison, interaction, and sociality of things, value stands for the abstracted and abstract principle of thinghood, for the relational non-relationality in which and through which the thing becomes the thing: (Signsponge): “the always other or the other-thing…makes of the thing a thing, the thingness, shall we say of the thing [la chose autre ou l’autre chose…fait de la chose une chose, la chosesité, allons-y, de la chose]” (SI 92/3). In the inherent relatedness of things, of one thing to the other, from which value springs forth the becoming-thing of the thing is exemplified with the utmost lucidity (and vulgarity), even if the same exemplification occludes the relations between the human “bearers” of the commodities. The problem, however, is that, to the extent that it extorts the valuable or the symbolic and discards the materiality of the “shell” wherein the trace is built right into the substrate, this lucid exemplification attempts to master and to dominate the thing, does not let it breathe, does not run the risk of the event.

The repetitive substitution that grounds value exploits the internal instability of the thing, capitalizes on its unrest, re-presents it as such, but foregoes the difficulty of replacing the irreplaceable. Although any process of production involves “idealization, autonomization and automation, dematerialization and spectral incorporation, mourning work coextensive with all work, and so forth” (SM 166), the specifically capitalist production privileging the self valorization of value releases, autonomizes, and incorporates the thing into the kind of de-humanized, living-dead intentionality that does not leave any breathing space or spacing for the thing. Its presumed independence from the human producer extends into the worst slavery when the alien intentionality of capital binds to and overwrites the thing. And, finally, the work of mourning instigated by surplus value overlaps and intensifies the work of mourning driven by the dissemination of the product that now exists “without me”.

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7 On the profit gained from the ostensibly useless play, see also PC 321.
An aspect of the same movement, the exteriorization of the inner frame hurls use-value outward. The thrust of use-value’s projection does not aim to return the shoes to their rightful owner (either the peasant, or the painter, or, for that matter, anyone else) but to discharge the debt incurred to the thing itself, that is to say, to the things (the shoes) themselves. To be sure, this aim or this thrust reaches the threshold of the impossible given that the demand of the thing is silent, given that “[d]emanding everything and nothing, the thing puts the debtor (the one who would wish to say properly my thing) in a situation of absolute heteronomy” (SI 48). Nonetheless, the impossible demand glimpses the event in which, instead of being appropriated and expropriated, the thing itself, like the singularly universal sponge in Signspunge, immemorially and receptively conditions, absorbs, and “propriates” everything, whether proper or not.

The event of the thingly propriation is the restitution of time (including the labor-time expended on its “production” and the ecstatic temporality of its self-remarking) to the thing itself in what will have been another vision, another dream of the re-appropriation of surplus value. The shoe at rest, then, not only temporizes by delaying its being-worn-out beyond repair, but also messianically awaits, “without the horizon of expectation”, the turning of time, or the return of the time that elapsed in use: “Moved by a mysterious force, the thing itself demands gift and restitution, it requires therefore “time”, “term”, “delay”, “interval” of temporalization…” (GT 40). To repay the debt to the thing itself it is not enough to render it useless or to discard the material substratum in which the traces of use are etched. Rather, this repayment stimulates the reversal of usage and its consequences, the ghostly revenance of the thing’s devalued, worn out value, and, above all, the supplemental replacement of the irreplaceable.

Overwriting the back and forth invaginations, subtractions, and projections is the question: What does the frame enframe? The obvious answer summons the thing, but also the work—the thing whose thinghood works, and the animated work whose workability bethings, becomes another thing in the supplemental series of displacements and substitutions. The “three things of the thing [trois choses de la chose]” enumerated in Specters of Marx (9/29) inevitably refer themselves to work in a move that deconstructs the Heideggerian distinction solidified in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. From the work of mourning (le travail du deuil), to the iterative generativity of ghostly generations, to the transformative elaboration (“the thing works, whether it transforms or transforms itself, poses or decomposes itself [la chose travaille, qu’elle transforme ou se transforme, qu’elle pose ou se décompose]”), the thing is a self-interruptive, disseminative process that retracts itself (SM 9/30). The dynamics of thinghood can be best understood through the enigmatic syntagma “the three things of the thing” that accentuates the inherent multiplicity (the number is not just double, simply divided against itself, but triple) of each thing, that is to say, the difference of forces constitutive of the things “in” the thing, of the others in the same. Although this composition is also the process of decomposition (of mourning, etc.), the genitive form of the syntagma betrays the proper-

8 This, I believe, is Derrida’s tacit answer to the initial question he posed: “To whom and to what, in consequence would one have to restitute them [the shoes], render them, to discharge a debt?” (TP 258).
ative event of restitution in which the thing is released into its own, abandoned to and
loved in its creative self-ruination.

Before the instant of restitution arrives, however, parergonal capital binds itself to
the inner work of the thing. In a “phenomenological ‘conjuring trick’”, the inapparent
is made to appear in the sensuous non-sensuous, disembodied body of the commodity
as “a ‘thing’ without phenomenon, a thing in flight that surpasses the senses [une “chose” sans phénomène, une chose en fuite qui passé les sens]” (SM 150). The non-phenomenal difference of forces inherent to the thing, the very destabilizing difference that is responsible for the perpetual slippage of the thing itself from phenomenological grasp and for its flight steering away from the pre-calculated trajectory of the throw, undergoes quantification in the process of exchange. The thing that poses and decomposes itself in the realm refractory to the light of phenomenology is ex-posed and betrayed—in the double meaning of “being betrayed”—thematized and lost in its numerical exposition. Thus, violating the law of the thing that operates “without an exchange and without the transaction” (SI 14), the conjuring trick levels and objectifies the traces of work it contained.

These traces evincing the amount of the socially necessary labor time that went into
the production of the commodity-thing are parted, (unjustly) shared, and subsequently
obscured. If commodity fetishism has a core around which it revolves, it is the trick of
making the inapparent appear qua inapparent, of making surplus value, the outside of
the outside, withdraw as soon as it approaches us (or as soon as we approach it practically or theoretically), and of turning the effects of this withdrawal into profit. The producer receives only a part of the thing’s work back, while the remainder is capitalized, rendered futural, reinvested, forced to work further in the form of the remains—in the form of the temporal-temporalizing thing that it is.

Any kind of detachment or formalization of the frame spells out the loss of its flexi-

bility and the ablation of the differential of forces on which capital relies. Hence, the double bind par excellence: binding itself to the thing that inherently falls into pieces, capital ruins itself, but unbinding itself from the ruinous thing, it loses its borrowed energy and comes undone. The enframing (of) value is de-bordered, exceeded, by the enframed “working thing” or “thinging work”. Setting the thing to work is unhinging the frame.

The way in which the thing is set to work in the epoch of globalization—
the epoch of unhinged frames, dis-adjustments, new liberations and new confine-
ments—both violates and exposes the “truth” of the thing. Embodying the abstract prin-
ciple of sociality and purifying the cut of non-relationality, the commodity follows the
course of the becoming-thing of the thing as such. The ideality of the “as such” wrought
from the substantiality of the thing fully deserves the title of fetishism. But, in addition
to commodity fetishism, Derrida draws the attention of his readers to what may be ter-
med “world fetishism”: the inflation of discourses and processes, theories and practices,
of globalization, mondialisation, the becoming-world of the world (N 375). Not only do
the two phenomena or, better, the two phenomenalizations (of the thing and of the world)
dovetail thanks to the idealization they precipitate, but they are also deeply imbricated
with one another, with “religion”, and with the economic rationality that propels them.
Like the process of commodification, mondialisation denotes the essentially soci-
al time-space of the relentless being-with\(^9\). The sociality of the world mediated throu-
gh the infinite variety of media and telecommunication systems translates into a kind of
contiguity, in which any given point on the nascent homogenized plane instantaneously
finds itself in the closest proximity to every other point. Increasingly, the “re-linked”
world (“religion” is not far from this re-linking\(^10\)) comes to affect itself both as the refer-
ential totality of things signifying their usefulness and as the \textit{wherein} of this totality\(^11\).
Its ideal is the sociality without respite and without respiration, the pure relationality of
the absolute bond that defies all unraveling, and the complete consumption/consumma-
tion of the differential spacing on the smooth surface of the globe.

Such an ideal is, certainly, impossible. Auto-affection cannot operate outside the he-
tero-affective fold\(^12\), and so the “new world order” turns inside out and into the “new
world disorder”, the disjuncture or disadjustment of the world that wears itself out “in ex-
pansion, in growth itself, which is to say, in the becoming worldwide of the world [\textit{cette
usure dans l’expansion, dans la croissance même, c’est-à-dire dans la mondialisation
du monde}]” (SM 78/130). Formally, this wear and tear is redolent of the predicament of
the Heideggerian unhandy, broken, unworkable thing that drops out of the total context
of referentiality and constitutes a breach in this totality. Yet, to return to Derrida, what
if the decaying growth and the disarticulated articulation of the world that auto-affecti-
vively comes into its own derives from the “normal” self-ruination of the thing that falls
apart in remarking itself as other? The event of mondialisation projects the commodity-
thing writ large onto the inflated body of the \textit{socium}, but also telegraphically transmits
all the contradictions of the commodity-economic logic from the so-called “uneven de-
velopment” (the non-coincidence of the world, the globe, the earth, etc.) to the aporetic
conjuncture of the monetary pure cut and the worldly pure contiguity. And, in so doing,
it reluctantly reiterates the irreducibility of the thingly non-relational relationality.

Negatively and obliquely, the worlding world conjures up the thing via the exclu-
son of work: “Let us say or make as if the world began where work ended, as if the glo-

\(9\) “…the concept of the world gestures toward a history, it has a memory that distinguishes it from that of the
globe, of the universe, of the Earth, of the \textit{cosmos}…For the world begins by designating, and tends to remains,
in an Abrahamic tradition …a particular time-space, a certain oriented history of human brotherhood, of what
in this Pauline language one calls \textit{citizens of the world} (sympolitai, fellow citizens of the saints in the house
of God), brothers, fellow men, neighbors, insofar as they are creatures and sons of God” (N 374-5).

\(10\) This is one of the things that leads Leonard Lawlor [\textit{Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenom-
enology} (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002)] to write: “What makes \textit{Specters of
Marx} so uncanny is that, in a book purportedly on Marxism, Derrida sees to be reviving the political power of
religious faith” (p. 224). But “the political power of religious faith” is revived in Derrida only if we carefully
isolate the precise meaning of each word in this syntagma, understanding, for instance, “religion” in terms of
a divided possibility of re-linking the world through self-affective globalization and through hetero-affective
secret community of the New International. The same applies to “faith” which stands for the irreducibility of
credit, credibility, trust \textit{and} of their violation at the root of any being-with, etc.

\(11\) Martin Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}. Trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harp-

\(12\) “\textit{Notre monde se touche}”, “our world touches itself, can be touched, is touched; our world \textit{is in touch}”
(OT 53) presupposes that it has, first, detached from itself and from us, and that it hetero-affects itself in its
very auto-affection.
balization of the world has both as its horizon and its origin the disappearance of what we call *work*, this old word, painfully charged with so much meaning and history” (N 377). The paleonymization of work is consonant with the ambiguous vacillation between *désœuvrement* and the unrecognized, conceptually unrecognizable labor converted into surplus value; the non-affirmative “end” of the mournful “working-through” in the melancholic identification that “acts out”; and the parergonal frame disencumbered from the *ergon* it enframes. The thing withdraws along with “this old word” to which it is bound, but this time its recession is fostered not by the ideality of the “as such”, but by the virtuality of the “as if” (“as if the world began where work ended”): by the avowed theoretical fiction that lays bare the grounds for its own incredible credibility. This virtual withdrawal writes the fable where the “end of work”—its culmination, its goal and cessation—produces a very particular product—the world—that, in the course of *mondialisation*, scratches out from its surface the label “Made in…”, or even just “Made!” and that, consequently, represents itself as a *sui generis* simple unity busy with affecting itself. In other words, the theoretical fiction pinpoints the metaphysical myth of the origin that works to suppress the other of origin and the other origins (e.g. archi-writing, or the self-remarking, self-disseminating work of the thing) and that presents, clinically, the meta-symptoms of the most stubborn resistance to analysis.

The withdrawal of work from the beginning of the world takes us back to *Of Spirit*, where Derrida examines Heidegger’s definition of the thing as “worldless” and uncovers a certain taken-for-granted, yet unarticulated syllogism. 1) The philosopher’s paradigmatic thing—the stone—is “without world [*weltlos*]” (OS 48). 2) The world is always spiritual (OS 47). 3) “*Geist* thus forms part of the series of non-things, of what in general one claims to oppose to the thing. It is what in no way allows itself to be thingified” (OS 16). The worldly realm of spirituality that Dasein dispenses to itself requires, at minimum, the ability discursively to relate to oneself as other (to place and to hear a call from oneself to oneself), to lag behind and to run ahead of oneself, and, in this ecstasis, to relate to the being of beings. The ecstatic relationality is denied to the worldless, breathless, inanimate thing determined in its mute “*whatness*”, but the fable does not end here. One of the constant threads running through *Of Spirit* is Heidegger’s *avoidance of spirit* that, positively understood, veers on the side of the thing in an attempt to bring us close to its breathlessness, its exemption from spirit. To steer clear of *Geist*, for Heidegger, would be to avoid “what in no way allows itself to be thingified” and analytically to embrace more than the everyday human Dasein in its everydayness.

Despite this cautionary avoidance, the becoming-world of the world is contingent upon the forgetting of its birth or emanation (the forgetting of “becoming” itself) from the thing’s sociality before and beyond commerce and other Dasein-related activities. It is on account of such interested, invested forgetting that the thing haunts, if to haunt is to cause dehiscence, to have and to form the world, to cleave open a spacing without dwelling in it:

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13 The book starts with the question “What is avoiding?” and continues: “Sein und Zeit (1927): what does Heidegger say that that time? He announces and he prescribes. He *warns* [*avertit*]: a certain number of terms will have to be avoided (*vermeiden*). Among them, spirit (*Geist*)” (OS 1).
The animated work becomes that thing, the Thing that, like an elusive specter, engineers a habitation without proper inhabiting, call it a haunting of both memory and translation [L’œuvre animée devient cette chose, la Chose qui s’ingénie à habiter sans proprement habiter, soit à hanter, tel un insaisissable spectre, et la mémoire et la traduction]…The Thing haunts, for example, it causes, it inhabits without residing [La Chose hante, par exemple, elle cause, elle habite sans y résider] (SM 18/42).

Let us try to keep abreast of the blistering locution of this passage. The animated work, l’œuvre animée, is part and parcel of spirit (anima in Latin can mean “spirit”, “breath”, or “soul”) insofar as it breathes without me as soon as I dissolve my living bond with it. Part and parcel of spirit, it parts and parcels the spiritual unity into spectral dissemination (“like an elusive specter”). In turn, the becoming-animated of work—its spectrality—is nothing else than the thing immediately capitalized (“that thing, the Thing”) in order to emphasize the hesitation between “whatness” and “whoness”. While the state of being animated is also animating, in the transition from the passive to the active voice, the Thing assumes the properties of a “who” and “engineers [s’ingénie] a habitation”. The meaning of “engineering” must be supplemented with the etymology on which Derrida elaborates elsewhere\(^\text{14}\) and which draws together such words as “genius”, “genesis”, “genealogy”, and “genre”. In light of this juxtaposition, the animated-animating work-thing stands at the “genesis” of habitation but it does not inhabit that which it generates (“without proper inhabiting”) or, in other words, withdraws itself from the spacing that it provides. Termed “haunting”, the movement of the giving withdrawal and the withdrawing gift whose objects are not confined to memory and translation extends to the habitation, or the dwelling of any interiority, to the world inhabited by something or someone other than the Thing that haunts and does not abide (“sans y résider”). It does not abide in the “there” which it engineers or causes (note, again, the ambiguity of the Latin causa: thing or cause), but the very acknowledgement of its ingenuous generativity is sufficient enough to dispute and displace all designations of “worldlessness”. Thus, hauntology is the operationality of the thing that works and that “worlds”, disseminating or diffracting, in an ironic twist on the ontico-ontological difference, the spiritual unity of the world into a multiplicity of specters.

It is no accident that the becoming-world of the world is forgetful of its own genealogy. Forgetting is already anticipated by the thing that, instead of inhabiting, haunts memory, that approaches and gives the world only to retract itself from it, that forces everything to begin “before it begins” (SM 161). The phenomenalization of the world merely hypostatizes the withdrawal proper to the thing, forgoing its quasi-transcendental, world-giving “function” and reducing it to a worldless entity within the world. Structurally, the hypostatized withdrawal is compatible with the monetary purification of the thing’s detachment untied from substantial sociality. That is to say: the itinerary of the world posited at the end of work leads to money, to the always-spiritual curren-

that puts one above one’s work, disengages one from it. Both the fall of the remain-
der concurrent with the purification of the thingly cut and its incorporation in *monnaie*
are the preconditions for the auto-affection of the world that exchanges itself with itself and with the ostensibly non-relational non-world from which it is born in the net-
works of unequal exchange. Pure exchangeability, the becoming-world of the world expresses itself in the institution of the world market, in “a front among fronts, a confronta-
tion” of commodities (SM 155). But the “real” confrontation lacking either a front, or a frontier, the confrontation of a “front without front” of the event (PTT 91) transpires between the market and the work of the thing that underwrites and interrupts it, engineerers and haunts it, because the world remains the world of things.

**ABBREVIATIONS OF JACQUES DERRIDA’S WORKS:**


**LO:** “Living On: Border Lines”. Trans. James Hulbert, in Harold Bloom et al., *De-

**N:**  *Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001*. Trans. Elizabeth Rotte-


**SM:**  *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New In-


15 On money as “the spirit of the market”, see N 315ff.
MAJKL MRDER
Nju Jork

DERIDINA FENOMENOLOGIJA VREDNOSTI
I STVAR U EPOHI GLOBALIZACIJE

Apstrakt: U ovom članku razmatram da li Deridin spis o Marksu skicira “dvostruki okvir” koji konstituiše fenomenologiju vrednosti. Međutim, unutrašnji deo okvira sačinjen je od upotrebnih vrednosti (shvaćenih kao “working thing” ili “thinking work”), a spoljašnje korespondira razmernik-vrednosti koja proističe iz neujednačenog preklapanja njih dve započinjući u formi ekonomskih redukcija, supstrukcija i podataka. Utoliko raspravljam sudbinu unutrašnjeg okvira u epohi globalizacije u kojoj postajanje stvari po sebi koincidira sa projekcijom unutrašnjih okvira vrednosti u svetu.

Ključne reči: stvarstvo; fetišizam robe, svet, delo, okvir